The Economist has published a detailed report titled “What a massacre reveals about Abiy Ahmed’s Ethiopia”, shedding light on a recent atrocity in the Amhara region and its implications for the country’s political trajectory.
On March 31st, 2025, in the town of Birakat, Amhara region, clashes erupted between the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) and local militias. After the army secured control, eyewitnesses reported that a massacre ensued, with soldiers allegedly executing civilians suspected of supporting the militias. This incident is part of a broader pattern of state violence under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s administration, where military operations against insurgent groups have often resulted in civilian casualties.
The article contextualizes this event within Ethiopia’s escalating ethnic tensions and the government’s increasingly authoritarian measures. Since Abiy’s rise to power in 2018, initial reforms have given way to crackdowns on dissent, suppression of independent media, and the use of anti-terrorism laws to silence opposition. The government’s actions in regions like Tigray and Oromia, as well as the recent events in Amhara, reflect a shift from democratic aspirations to centralized control and militarized governance.
This report underscores the fragility of Ethiopia’s political landscape and raises concerns about the country’s direction under Abiy Ahmed’s leadership.
When Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, many Ethiopians and international observers hoped he would mark the beginning of a new era. He freed political prisoners, welcomed exiled opposition groups, and struck a historic peace with Eritrea. The West, eager for a success story in a volatile region, showered him with praise—culminating in the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019.
But that narrative has not aged well. Today, Abiy rules not as a democratic reformer but as a calculating strongman. His grip on power increasingly resembles the authoritarianism of Ethiopia’s past leaders, only cloaked in the language of unity and modernisation.
The shift became starkly evident during the civil war in Tigray. After a political falling-out with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)—once the dominant party in the ruling coalition—Abiy launched a military campaign in 2020 that spiraled into a full-blown conflict. The war was marked by atrocities: mass rapes, ethnic cleansing, and famine. Though a fragile peace deal was signed in 2022, accountability remains absent, and the underlying political grievances are unresolved.
In parallel, Abiy has turned the machinery of the state against other perceived enemies. In Oromia, his own ethnic heartland, rebel groups like the Oromo Liberation Army have battled federal forces. In Amhara, local militias rose up when Abiy moved to disarm them. The government’s response has been brutal. Drone strikes, house-to-house searches, and extrajudicial killings are now common.
Across the country, dissent is being crushed. Independent journalists have been jailed. Internet blackouts are deployed with alarming frequency. Opposition figures, from all ethnic backgrounds, are either imprisoned or exiled. The courts are pliant; the national election commission toothless. A once-vibrant civil society is now largely silenced.
Abiy’s rhetoric has also changed. Where he once spoke of reconciliation, he now invokes Ethiopia’s imperial past, drawing inspiration from Menelik II and Haile Selassie. His party, Prosperity Party, seeks to centralize power, undermining Ethiopia’s ethnofederal structure—a risky move in a country where ethnic identity is deeply political.
The prime minister portrays these actions as necessary to “save Ethiopia.” But increasingly, that salvation looks like repression in the name of stability. State media frame critics as traitors. Federal forces act with impunity. His regime, while not yet a total dictatorship, exhibits the hallmarks of competitive authoritarianism: elections without real competition, courts without independence, and a press without freedom.
Unlike traditional dictators, Abiy does not rely solely on brute force. He is charismatic, articulate, and adept at shifting narratives. But charisma without accountability is dangerous. Abiy has centralized power in his own hands while weakening institutions that might check him. The parliament is a rubber stamp. Regional governments are under surveillance. His inner circle is small, loyal, and opaque.
Abiy’s authoritarian turn is not merely a domestic concern. Ethiopia is the anchor of the Horn of Africa. Its instability spills over into Somalia, Sudan, and Eritrea. As Ethiopia teeters, the region becomes more combustible.
The tragedy is that Ethiopia had a chance—however slim—for a more democratic future. Abiy Ahmed was once the symbol of that hope. Now, he increasingly resembles the autocrats he claimed to replace.
